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Essay

Who Decides Where the Renewables Should
Go?: A Response to Danielle Stokes’ Renewable
Energy Federalism
Michael B. Gerrard†
One of the central tasks in addressing the climate crisis is
transitioning from an energy system based on fossil fuels to one that
mainly uses renewable energy. In her article “Renewable Energy
Federalism,” Professor Danielle Stokes has highlighted one of the key
impediments to this transition—delays in state and local permitting
of renewable energy facilities.1 She has proposed a new approach that
would give more authority to the federal government. 2 Stokes’
approach has much to commend it. However, I differ on some aspects.
I will begin by describing the magnitude of the problem—the
amount of new renewable capacity that is needed for the United States
to meet its climate objectives. Then I will describe the current system
(if it can be called that) for deciding what renewable facilities are built
where, and how Stokes would change that system. I will provide some
historical perspective on how major projects have been sited, and the
important role of private developers in energy generation projects.
Finally, I will offer my views on which parts of Stokes’ proposal I
would follow and which I would modify or discard.

† Michael B. Gerrard is Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice and
Faculty Director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School,
and a member and former chair of the faculty of Columbia’s Earth Institute (now the
Columbia Climate School). His most recent book is Legal Pathways to Deep
Decarbonization in the United States (ed. with John C. Dernbach, 2019). Copyright ©
2022 by Michael B. Gerrard.
1. See generally Danielle Stokes, Renewable Energy Federalism, 106 MINN. L. REV.
1757 (2022).
2. Id.
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I. NEED FOR NEW RENEWABLES
In conjunction with rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement in
2021, the Biden Administration submitted a pledge to reduce U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions by fifty to fifty-two percent below 2005
levels by 2030. 3 President Biden has also announced the goals of
having a zero-emissions power sector by 2035, and net zero emissions
for the entire country by 2050.4 These goals are generally in line with
the objective of keeping global average temperatures within 1.5°C
above pre-industrial conditions, which the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change has shown to be about the level above which
catastrophic climate change occurs.5
Several studies have examined the amount of new renewable
electricity capacity that would be needed to achieve these goals. One
study concluded that by 2050 the total U.S. wind and solar capacity
would need to grow from the current 150 gigawatts (GW) to about
3,200 GW, with a buildout rate in the 2040s of more than 160 GW per
year.6 Another study, using different methodologies and assumptions,
came to roughly comparable conclusions. 7 To put these numbers in
3. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION,
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES: A 2030 EMISSIONS TARGET 1 (2021),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%
20States%20of%20America%20First/United%20States%20NDC%20April%
2021%202021%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KWB-WH5U].
4. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES: PATHWAYS TO NET-ZERO GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY 2050 1, 5 (Nov.
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/US-Long-Term
-Strategy.pdf?source=email#:~:text=The%20Long%2DTerm%20Strategy%20shows,
every%20sector%20of%20the%20economy.&text=This%20will%20put%20the%
20United,%2C%20resilient%2C%20and%20equitable%20economy [https://perma
.cc/P2VS-4GAW].
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 7–
10 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_
Report_Low_Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6AN-W598].
6. James H. Williams, Ryan A. Jones, Ben Haley, Gabe Kwok, Jeremy Hargreaves,
Jamil Farbes, & Margaret S. Torn, Carbon-Neutral Pathways for the United States, 2 AGU
ADVANCES 1, 7, 13 (2021), https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10
.1029/2020AV000284 (last visited May 2, 2022). In 2021, about twenty-eight GW was
added. Clean Power Quarterly Report Q4 2021, AM. CLEAN POWER, https://cleanpower
.org/resources/clean-power-quarterly-report-q4-2021/?utm_source=newsletter&
utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosgenerate&stream=top
[https://perma.cc/EJ5L-3MZ3] (“The U.S. clean energy industry installed 27,723 MW
of wind, solar, and energy storage capacity in 2021 . . . .”).
7. ERIC LARSON, CHRIS GREIG, JESSE JENKINS, ERIN MAYFIELD, ANDREW PASCALE, CHUAN
ZHANG, JOSHUA DROSSMAN, ROBERT WILLIAMS, STEVE PACALA, ROBERT SOCOLOW, EJEONG
BAIK, RICH BIRDSEY, RICK DUKE, RYAN JONES, BEN HALEY, EMILY LESLIE, KEITH PAUSTIAN, &
AMY SWAN, NET-ZERO AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IMPACTS 99,
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perspective, the largest wind farm in the United States (onshore in the
Mojave desert) has a capacity of 1.5 GW;8 the largest offshore wind
farm in the world (off the coast of England in the North Sea) is 1.2 GW;9
the largest planned solar farm in the U.S. (in Nevada) is 0.7 GW. 10 In
other words, the U.S. would need to be building more than 100 of
today’s largest facilities each and every year. The amount of high
voltage transmission capacity would need to about triple. 11
Two reasons that so much new renewable generating capacity is
required are that all the existing coal and most of the natural gas
power plants will need to be shut down and their electricity replaced
with clean power, and at the same time the demand for electricity will
soar.12 An essential element of any effort to decarbonize the economy
is to use clean-sourced electricity instead of fossil fuels wherever
feasible.13 This would be led by having all new motor vehicles
powered by electricity rather than by gasoline or diesel (except for
some heavy trucks, which might need hydrogen or other
technologies); converting the heating, cooling, and hot water systems
of buildings from natural gas and oil to electricity; and switching many
industrial processes to electricity.14 All of this, coupled with economic
and population growth, will lead to a large increase in the demand for
electricity—perhaps a doubling or tripling by 2050, depending on the
scenario.15
Most of the studies that project the need for so much new wind
and solar capacity place little reliance on new nuclear power.16 One
that does calls for 250 new 1 GW nuclear power plants, or 3,800 small
100 (2020), https://environmenthalfcentury.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf331/
files/2020-12/Princeton_NZA_Interim_Report_15_Dec_2020_FINAL.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/PT8H-4YJ7] (showing needed wind and solar buildout rates under various
scenarios).
8. Jenn Cranney, World’s Largest Wind Farms, NW. RENEWABLE ENERGY INST . (Aug.
20,
2021),
https://www.nw-rei.com/2021/08/20/worlds-largest-wind-farms
[https://perma.cc/LTD3-PCCH].
9. Id.
10. Darrell Proctor, Feds Back Construction of Largest U.S. Solar Farm, POWER (Jan.
2, 2020), https://www.powermag.com/feds-back-construction-of-largest-u-s-solar
-farm [https://perma.cc/PX86-CTLU].
11. LARSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 106.
12. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 3.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 6–13.
15. Id. at 3 (reporting 4,170 TWh total electric generation in 2020; 9,550–12,840
TWh under various 2050 scenarios).
16. Id. at 4.
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modular nuclear reactors,17 to supply much of the needed 3,200 GW
(there are now ninety-three operating reactors in the U.S. and each
one typically has a capacity of 0.5 to 1 GW; small modular nuclear
reactors do not yet exist on a commercial scale).18 However, the
economics of building new nuclear power plants in the United States
have become impossible.19 Five years ago, four nuclear plants were
under construction in this country—two in South Carolina and two in
Georgia.20 The severely delayed and over budget South Carolina plants
were cancelled in 2017 after $9 billion in expenditures, driving its
builder, Westinghouse, into bankruptcy. 21 The Georgia plants are
costing more than double their initial $14 billion price tag and are at
least seven years behind schedule.22 New technologies such as small
modular nuclear reactors and fusion plants are the subject of serious
research projects, but commercial-scale application of them appears
to be at least a decade or two away.23 The technological and financial
uncertainties are such that we cannot rely on them today to solve the
problem.
17. LARSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 10.
18. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): How Much Electricity Does a Nuclear Power
Plant Generate?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www
.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=104&t=3#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20the%20R.E.%
20Ginna,relatively%20high%20annual%20capacity%20factors [https://perma.cc/
BD3X-VHQ9].
19. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN A CARBON CONSTRAINED
WORLD
xi
(2018),
https://energy.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/
The-Future-of-Nuclear-Energy-in-a-Carbon-Constrained-World.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6WU9-VGVT].
20. Brad Plumer, U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are Abandoned,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/climate/nuclear
-power-project-canceled-in-south-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/YTU5-8BBH].
21. Akela Lacy, South Carolina Spent $9 Billion to Dig a Hole in the Ground and
Then Fill It Back In, INTERCEPT (Feb. 6, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/02/06/
south-caroline-green-new-deal-south-carolina-nuclear-energy
[https://perma.cc/
2NT9-HXXH]; Westinghouse Agrees to Pay $20 Million over Failed Nuclear Project,
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
westinghouse-agrees-to-pay-20-million-over-failed-nuclear-project/2021/08/30/
f8a13b6e-099c-11ec-aea1-42a8138f132a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5W9B
-9EE4].
22. Kristi E. Swartz, Plant Vogtle Hits New Delays; Costs Surge Near $30B, ENERGY
WIRE (Feb. 18, 2022), https://www.eenews.net/articles/plant-vogtle-hits-new-delays
-costs-surge-near-30b [https://perma.cc/3WF2-CB9M].
23. Arjun Makhijani & M. V. Ramana, Can Small Modular Reactors Help Mitigate
Climate Change?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (July 21, 2021), https://thebulletin.org/
premium/2021-07/can-small-modular-reactors-help-mitigate-climate-change (last
visited May 2, 2022).
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II. WHO NOW DECIDES WHAT RENEWABLES ARE BUILT AND
WHERE THEY GO
Apart from military applications, there are few federal mandates
to build new renewable energy facilities.24 Federal tax incentives such
as the production tax credit (used mostly for wind projects) and the
investment tax credit (used mostly for solar projects) encourage but
do not require the construction of new facilities.25 The most important
mandates are at the state level. Thirty-one states and the District of
Columbia have adopted renewable portfolio standards—
requirements that electric utilities provide a certain percentage of
their electricity from renewable sources.26 These have been important
drivers of the construction of new renewables.27 Increasingly, many
large private companies are also committing to acquire much or all of
their electricity from renewable sources in order to meet zero carbon
goals.28 Some states also call for bids to provide electricity from
renewables; the resulting power is then sold to the electric utilities.29
The plummeting costs of building wind and solar facilities and their
very low operating costs (they do not need to buy fuel) have further
created incentives to build such facilities.30

24. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., CLEAN ENERGY STANDARDS: STATE AND FEDERAL
POLICY OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS ix (Nov. 2019), https://www.c2es.org/wp
-content/uploads/2019/11/clean-energy-standards-state-and-federal-policy
-options-and-considerations.pdf [https://perma.cc/JER2-UFPH].
25. MICHAEL B. GERRARD, THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES
145 (2011).
26. Renewable Energy Explained: Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(June 29, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/renewable-sources/portfolio
-standards.php [https://perma.cc/YN89-5RRT].
27. GALEN BARBOSE, BERKELEY LAB, U.S. RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: 2021
STATUS UPDATE: EARLY RELEASE (Feb. 2021), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/
default/files/rps_status_update-2021_early_release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CD87
-9PYL].
28. Catherine Thorbecke, Over 200 Companies Pledge Net-Zero Emissions by 2040
as Pressure on Private Sector Mounts, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2021), https://abcnews.go
.com/Business/200-companies-pledge-net-emissions-2040-pressure-private/story?
id=80124841 [https://perma.cc/76TX-7WK5].
29. Solicitations for Large-Scale Renewables, N.Y. CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD,
https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/Renewable
-Generators-and-Developers/RES-Tier-One-Eligibility/Solicitations-for-Long-term
-Contracts [https://perma.cc/CD9L-PBVV].
30. Will Mathis, Building New Renewables Is Cheaper than Burning Fossil Fuels,
BLOOMBERG GREEN (June 23, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2021-06-23/building-new-renewables-cheaper-than-running-fossil-fuel-plants
[https://perma.cc/NX8Q-NCE9].
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Almost none of these mandates or incentives specify where the
new wind and solar facilities should be built. That choice is left almost
entirely to private developers. They determine where they can
acquire suitable land (by purchase or lease) in locations that have
good sun or wind resources and are or could be served by
transmission lines that would carry the power they generate to where
it would be used.31 The federal government (usually through the
Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management—both within the Department of the Interior)
occasionally holds auctions to lease federal lands and waters for
renewable facilities, but even there the private developers decide the
exact locations and designs.32
Upon getting the rights to a site, the private developers must then
secure the necessary construction approvals. 33 Except for those to be
built on federal land or waters, the projects almost always need
approval from a local government—county, city, or town.34 Some local
governments have zoning codes and almost all of them require
building permits or other approvals. 35 Obtaining these approvals
often requires going through elaborate processes, such as those of
town zoning or planning boards.36 Some neighbors of proposed
facilities oppose these projects because, for example, they do not like
the sight of wind turbines.37 In many places these neighbors have
succeeded in persuading their local governments to ban or restrict the
projects, or in bringing lawsuits that stop the projects. 38 To be sure,
31. Wind Project Site Selection, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY,
https://windexchange.energy.gov/projects/site-selection
[https://perma.cc/7J6D
-5L64].
32. Peter Daniels, Siting Renewable Energy on Public Lands: Existing Regulations
and Recommendations, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 5, http://eelp.law
.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/PDaniels_EELP_Renewables-Siting_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24AD-RB64].
33. Small Community Wind Handbook, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY,
https://windexchange.energy.gov/small-community-windhandbook#zoning [https://perma.cc/7GZB-CLDX].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. John R. Nolan, Mitigating Climate Change by Zoning for Solar Energy Systems:
Embracing Clean Energy Technology in Zoning’s Centennial Year, 38 ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP. 1, 5–10 (2015), https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1995&context=lawfaculty [https://perma.cc/26FE-XNBV].
37. Ben Hoen, Jeremy Firestone, Joseph Rand, Debi Elliot, Gundula Hübner,
Johannes Pohl, Ryan Wiser, Eric Lantz, T. Ryan Haac, & Ken Kaliski, Attitudes of U.S.
Wind Turbine Neighbors: Analysis of a Nationwide Survey, 134 ENERGY POL’Y 1 (2019).
38. HILLARY AIDUN, JACOB ELKIN, RADHIKA GOYAL, KATE MARSH, & NEELY MCKEE,
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fossil fuel projects receive even more opposition. 39
Depending on their location, generation projects may also
require other approvals. 40 If they are in a state with traditionally
regulated vertical electric utilities, they require the approval of the
state public utility commission.41 Projects that would intrude upon
federally regulated wetlands or waters need the approval of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act. 42 Those that
could harm endangered species or their habitat may need approvals
from the Fish and Wildlife Service.43 Tall wind turbines, especially if
near airports, may need signoff from the Federal Aviation
Administration. 44 Many states have their own additional
environmental, land use, or electricity permitting requirements. 45
III. THE STOKES PROPOSAL
Stokes proposes the designation of a centralized siting agency—
probably the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), though
possibly the Renewable Transmission Organizations (RTOs) where
they exist.46 The agency would develop guidelines that
would prohibit: (1) the enactment [by state or local governments] of
regulations that have the effect of preventing renewable energy projects
within a jurisdiction; (2) restrictions in zoning regulations and certain
private covenants that provide for an outright ban of renewable energy
facilities (particularly in zones where a project is feasible or in close
proximity to transmission lines); and (3) untimely project approvals.47

The guidelines “could also make permit approval contingent
COLUM. L. SCH., S ABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., OPPOSITION TO RENEWABLE ENERGY
FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 2022), https://scholarship.law.columbia
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1186&context=sabin_climate_change
[https://
perma.cc/5AYX-UDNK].
39. David B. Spence, Regulation & the New Politics of (Energy) Market Entry, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327, 351 (2019).
40. See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, What Happens When the Green New
Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, 44 VT. L. REV. 693 (2020).
41. Kathryne Cleary & Karen Palmer, US Electricity Markets 101, RES. FOR THE
FUTURE
1,
2
(Mar.
30,
2020),
https://media.rff.org/documents/US_Electricity_Markets_
101.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L92-PH84].
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
43. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a), 1538(a).
44. 14 C.F.R. pt. 77.
45. Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale
Renewable Generation Capacity, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10591, 10605–09 (2017).
46. Stokes, supra note 1, at 1819.
47. Id. at 1818.
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upon compliance with general standards that require land restoration
and environmental protection in an effort to hold developers and
utility companies accountable in the climate change mitigation
process.”48 Federal financial assistance would be conditioned on
compliance with these standards.49
The Stokes proposal provides that “states and localities would
develop implementation plans to indicate how these objectives are
being met and would also have the ability to impose additional
requirements.”50 When a state fails to submit an adequate plan, the
federal siting body would be authorized to provide an implementation
plan.51 “Localities would still be permitted to determine the exact
location of [renewable] projects, but they would be provided a
framework and recommendations based upon the transmission grid.
Further, developers would only have to navigate one regulatory
system to obtain siting permits.”52
Stokes models parts of her proposal on the Clean Air Act, which
requires states to develop implementation plans to achieve and
maintain compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards.53 Other parts are modeled on the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (TCA), which limits the authority of local governments to
block cell phone towers.54
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE STOKES PROPOSAL
The TCA has been very successful in driving the construction of
cell phone towers nationwide.55 The number of towers installed
annually leapt from around 5,000 before the law’s enactment to more
than 20,000 afterwards.56 There are now over 417,000.57 This has
enabled mobile phones to become such a pervasive part of life today.
While prior to the TCA many local governments banned or inhibited
towers out of concerns over electromagnetic frequency (EMF)
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1818–19.
Id. at 1819.
Id. at 1823.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
Thomas A. Wikle, Cellular Tower Proliferation in the United States, 92
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 45 (2002).
56. Id. at 46.
57. 2021 ANNUAL SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS, CTIA, https://www.ctia.org/news/2021
-annual-survey-highlights [https://perma.cc/RU9D-FJ5A].
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radiation, the statute gives the Federal Communications Commission
the sole authority to set EMF standards.58 The TCA provides that local
governments may not ban towers entirely and must provide detailed
written explanations of any permit denials.59 Local governments are
required to act on tower applications “within a reasonable period of
time.”60 Tower applicants can obtain relief from the federal courts if
local governments are violating the TCA.61
As Stokes acknowledges, the application of something similar to
the TCA to renewable energy facilities was advocated by Professor
Ashira P. Ostrow in 2011. 62 Citing Ostrow, I called for it in 2017. 63
Using this model, Congress could prevent local governments
from banning renewable projects on the basis of aesthetics. Ideally the
impairment of views might be relevant to a permitting decision, but
the urgency of the climate crisis, and the need for a massive number
of new renewable facilities, mean that we no longer have this luxury.
Congress could require certain mitigation measures to reduce the
effects on birds, bats, and other species, but otherwise bar
disapprovals based on species impacts. As with the TCA, Congress
could require local review to be conducted in a reasonable time and
provide for federal court review of violations.
So, Stokes and I agree on the use of a TCA-like statute.
With respect to state plans, I think their principal focus should be
on transmission lines. As a prime example of how this can be done, in
the early 2000s the Texas Public Utility Commission developed a plan
for Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ). 64 As authorized by
the State Legislature in 2005, it designated corridors to carry power
from West Texas and the Texas Panhandle, where there are abundant
wind resources, to the cities in Central and East Texas, where most of
the population lives.65 The 2,400 miles of transmission lines carrying

58. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
59. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
60. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
61. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
62. Ashira P. Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 289 (2011).
63. Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10608.
64. JULIE COHN & OLIVERA JANKOVSKA, CTR. ENERGY STUDS., TEXAS CREZ LINES: HOW
STAKEHOLDERS SHAPE MAJOR ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (Nov. 2020),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/eb251d15/ces-pub-texascrez
-111720.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V4M-8BBZ].
65. Id.
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18.5 GW of power were completed in 2013. 66 Ratepayers ultimately
pay the cost.67 Since Texas has mostly isolated itself from the national
grid, it is not subject to FERC’s oversight and restrictions on rates and
other matters.68 The CREZ program, coupled with ample wind and
solar resources and a deregulated electricity market, has been
astonishingly successful. Wind farms sprouted up on lands leased
from farmers and other landowners who were happy to have the extra
income; total wind generation capacity went from 183 MW in 2000 to
33,133 MW in 2020. 69 Texas has by far the largest amount of wind
capacity in the country and is also continuing to build new capacity at
the fastest rate.70
The absence of transmission lines and the difficulty in connecting
with them are major impediments to the construction of new
renewables.71 Grid operators have their own processes for approving
connections with new generating facilities and these processes often
lead to extensive delays.72 The pace of transmission line construction
is far slower than what will be needed to achieve the necessary levels
of renewables.73 State transmission plans such as that of Texas could
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; Transmission & CREZ Fact Sheet, POWERING TEX., https://poweringtexas
.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Transmission-and-CREZ-Fact-Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EF6X-UZV7]; Texas Crez Projects, ELEC. TRANSMISSION TEX.,
http://www.ettexas.com/Projects/TexasCrez [https://perma.cc/4BXK-NRFC]; Texas
as a National Model for Bringing Clean Energy to the Grid, AM. CLEAN ENERGY GRID,
https://cleanenergygrid.org/texas-national-model-bringing-clean-energy-grid
[https://perma.cc/43A8-3TY8].
70. Dan Gearino, Inside Clean Energy: Texas Is the Country’s Clean Energy Leader,
Almost in Spite of Itself, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 17, 2022), https://
insideclimatenews.org/news/17022022/inside-clean-energy-texas-clean-energy
-leader [https://perma.cc/C7AF-789W].
71. Robert Walton, Propelling the Transition: New and Better Transmission Is Key
to Zero Carbon; Here’s What’s Driving It, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www
.utilitydive.com/news/propelling-the-transition-new-and-better-transmission-is
-key-to-zero-carbo/582331 [https://perma.cc/W6KV-XB98].
72. JAY CASPARY, MICHAEL GOGGIN, ROB GRAMLICH, & JESSE SCHNEIDER, AM. CLEAN
ENERGY GRID, DISCONNECTED: THE NEED FOR A NEW GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION POLICY 1,
4
(Jan.
2021),
https://cleanenergygrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/
Disconnected-The-Need-for-a-New-Generator-Interconnection-Policy-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9L2R-GUTB]; see, e.g., Miranda Wilson, Renewables Backlog Plan for
PJM Region Met with Mixed Reviews, ENERGYWIRE (Feb. 14, 2022), https://www
.eenews.net/articles/renewables-backlog-plan-for-pjm-region-met-with-mixed
-reviews [https://perma.cc/FR76-6TNX].
73. Jonathan M. Moch & Henry Lee, The Challenges of Decarbonizing the U.S.
Electric Grid by 2035, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. (Feb. 2022), https://www
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help alleviate this problem.
State plans could serve another purpose. One could imagine a
system in which each state is obligated to host clean energy facilities
with the generating capacity at least equal to that state’s percentage
of anticipated U.S. electricity demand in, say, 2035, when President
Biden has called for a zero-emissions grid.74 Alternatively, each state
could be required to host clean energy facilities sufficient to cover its
own anticipated electricity load. This would lead to the closure of
many fossil fuel generating plants, as once a wind or solar farm is built
its operating costs are very low.75 The wind and the sun are free and
are not subject to the price fluctuations that, for example, led to
spiking electricity bills in much of the United States in 2022, especially
the states whose power was mostly generated by natural gas.76 To be
sure, many states with too little renewable capacity will want to buy
power from states with an excess, which should be acceptable as a
way of minimizing the overall costs. Congress would need to enact
legislation that requires these state plans and enforces compliance
with them.
It is not clear what the nature or purpose of local plans would be.
There are about 39,000 general purpose local governments in the
United States;77 surely not every one would be expected to develop a
renewables siting plan, and the federal government would not be
expected to review them all. Some counties or towns might designate
particular locations for wind or solar projects, which would be a
.belfercenter.org/publication/challenges-decarbonizing-us-electric-grid-2035
[https://perma.cc/S7GA-2V9X].
74. Fact Sheet: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction
Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean
Energy Technologies, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden
-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good
-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies
[https://perma.cc/3UJY-X57P].
75. Renewables Increasingly Beat Even Cheapest Coal Competitors on Cost, INT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (June 2, 2020), https://www.irena.org/newsroom/
pressreleases/2020/Jun/Renewables-Increasingly-Beat-Even-Cheapest-Coal
-Competitors-on-Cost [https://perma.cc/RYB5-4NRU].
76. Danielle Silva, ‘A Lot of People Need Help’: Soaring Electric Bills Leave Some
Struggling to Pay, NBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us
-news/-lot-people-need-help-soaring-electric-bills-leave-struggling-pay-rcna16347
[https://perma.cc/7XJF-Z28H].
77. John Haughey, How to Understand and Contact Local Governments—Which
Preside over 95% of the U.S. Population, CQ (Apr. 6, 2016), https://info.cq.com/
resources/there-are-90000-local-governments-heres-why-you-need-to-know-who
-runs-them [https://perma.cc/2ZV7-N5MY].
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positive development, but requiring them all to do so and then
enforcing this requirement seems unworkable.
Rather, the task of identifying sites should chiefly be left to
private applicants, in my view. Private companies have the ability and
motivation to seek out land that is available from willing sellers or
lessors, and to negotiate a price. Stokes wisely does not advocate the
use of eminent domain for wind and solar farms, which would add a
great deal of controversy78—though eminent domain would still be
needed for transmission lines, which necessarily cross over multiple
properties; no landowner should be able to hold up the project.79
Renewables developers are also well equipped to identify what
transmission lines would meet their needs, and to determine what
physical characteristics a site needs to be suitable for their projects.80
Developers do this all the time, and the successful ones are proficient
at it.81 Under the TCA, cell tower sites are chosen by their developers,
not the government.82 Expecting government agencies to identify sites
could be administratively cumbersome, sow local distrust, and subject
the process to political interference by those who strongly favor or
strongly oppose particular sites.
Moreover, government designation of sites for unpopular
facilities has been shown to lead to ferocious local opposition.83
Congress attempted this with both the Nuclear Waste Policy Act84 (for
the spent fuel from nuclear power plants) and the Low-Level
Radioactive Policy Amendments Act.85 State and local opposition
mobilized so effectively that not a single gram of radioactive waste has
been disposed of under either statute.86 However, private companies
78. See, e.g., Perry Beeman, GOP Lawmakers Look to Block Eminent Domain for
Wind Farm Projects, IOWA CAP. DISPATCH (July 31, 2020), https://iowacapitaldispatch
.com/2020/07/31/gop-lawmakers-look-to-block-eminent-domain-for-wind-farm
-projects [https://perma.cc/BR58-ZQ4X].
79. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1104
(2013).
80. Michelle Froese, A Wind Developer’s Guide to the Transmission Grid,
WINDPOWER (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.windpowerengineering.com/wind
-developers-guide-transmission-grid [https://perma.cc/6HUW-RER9].
81. Klass, supra note 79, at 1105.
82. Information on Cell Tower Leasing and Development from Industry Experts,
CELLTOWERINFO.COM, https://www.celltowerinfo.com/site-selection [https://perma
.cc/XM47-N49E].
83. MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE B ACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC
AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 103–07 (1994).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 10101.
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j.
86. GERRARD, supra note 83, at 70; Jacob Berman, Wasting Away: America’s
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have succeeded in building disposal facilities for low-level radioactive
waste in Utah and Texas, without the benefit of any government siting
process (though with the necessary federal and state permits),87 and
private companies are also now advancing projects for the storage of
spent fuel in Texas 88 and New Mexico,89 though both projects are
facing local opposition. While wind and solar farms are not nearly as
unpopular as nuclear waste, they can still engender serious
opposition and litigation. At least some degree of local control—
rather than having a project jammed down the throats of an unwilling
community—seems important in securing approvals and ultimately
getting projects built. 90
This was not always so. In a prior era, federal officials unilaterally
selected sites for major projects. For example, the principal locations
for the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons—Hanford,
Washington; Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
Savannah River, South Carolina; and Rocky Flats, Colorado—were all
selected swiftly, with little or no public consultation (or geologic
study) by military officers or nuclear scientists between 1942 and
1951. 91
There was a time when powerful local officials could almost
unilaterally decide what facilities would be built and where, with little
or no public consultation. The exemplar was Robert Moses, who was
in charge of most road, bridge, tunnel, park, and public housing
construction in New York City and much of the rest of New York state
from the mid-1930s until the late-1960s.92 The “Moses era”—the
Dysfunctional System of Low-Level Radioactive Disposal, 3 SEATTLE J. ENV’T L. 271, 275–
76, 285–86 (2013).
87. Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N,
(Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html
[https://perma.cc/J9AD-Y5PR].
88. Susan Montoya Bryan, New Mexico Backs Texas in Opposing Nuclear Fuel
Storage, AP NEWS (Sept. 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/businessenvironment
-and-nature-texas-new-mexico-5963107ed241ad5e1a07c8217e691117 (last visited
May 2, 2022).
89. Sammy Feldblum & Tovah Strong, New Mexico Eyed for Major Nuclear Waste
Storage Facility, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.hcn.org/
articles/pollution-new-mexico-eyed-for-major-nuclear-waste-storage-facility
[https://perma.cc/AN9S-BM57].
90. See Ori Sharon, Fields of Dreams: An Economic Democracy Framework for
Addressing NIMBYism, 49 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10264 (2019).
91. GERRARD, supra note 83, at 47–48.
92. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
(1974).
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ability of the government to ram through massive projects without
public involvement—mostly ended with the enactment of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970 and the other
major federal and state environmental laws in the two decades that
followed.93 NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), and
other federal statutes have considerably slowed down many
construction projects—including those involving both “brown”
(fossil) and “green” (renewable) energy.94
The most recent nationwide infrastructure program led by the
federal government was the construction of the interstate highway
system, which began in the mid-1950s and was basically completed in
the early 1990s. 95 Though the federal Bureau of Public Roads sketched
out the overall outlines of the system, with its east-west and northsouth corridors, and the federal government paid ninety percent of
the construction costs, the states and cities played the central roles in
deciding the exact routes.96 NEPA, once enacted, became a major
impediment to the completion of some segments of the interstate
system.97
V. FEDERAL ROLE?
Stokes would bestow major approval authority for renewables
upon one federal agency.98 Under her proposal, “developers would
only have to navigate one regulatory system to obtain siting
permits.”99 That would presumably be the system run by the
centralized siting agency, which Stokes suggests be either FERC or the
RTOs.100 If we go in that direction, in my view the Department of
Energy would be a better choice. FERC chiefly engages in economic
regulation, and when it comes to electricity, it does so within the
strictures imposed by the Federal Power Act (which, by the way,
93. Philip Weinberg, SEQRA: Effective Weapon, If Used as Directed, 65 ALB. L. REV.
315, 315 (2001).
94. Philip Rossetti, R Street Policy Study No. 234: Addressing NEPA-Related
Infrastructure Delays, R STREET 1, 1 (July 2021), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/07/FINAL_RSTREET234.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XLF-6ZWW].
95. Marcia Wendorf, The Complex History of the U.S. Interstate Highway System,
INTERESTING ENG’G (Sept. 15, 2019), https://interestingengineering.com/the-complex
-history-of-the-us-interstate-highway-system (last visited May 2, 2022).
96. MARK H. ROSE & RAYMOND A. MOHL, INTERSTATE: HIGHWAY POLITICS AND POLICY
SINCE 1939 (3d ed. 2012).
97. E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
98. Stokes, supra note 1, at 1823
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1820–22.
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leaves control of generating facilities—as opposed to transmission
lines—to the states).101 The RTOs are in effect governed mostly by the
electric utilities, which are not the entities we want in charge of this
process, since the utilities’ interests are not necessarily those of the
public.102 The Department of Energy, in contrast, has expertise in a
much broader array of energy issues.103
However, there is a big problem with giving prime permitting
authority to a federal agency—either FERC or the Department of
Energy. If this agency needed to approve individual projects rather
than only issue general guidelines, that could make those projects
sufficiently federal to bring them within the ambit of NEPA, 104 Section
7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 105 the National Historic
Preservation Act,106 and other federal laws. Projects on federal lands
or waters, or receiving federal money, or being built by a federal
agency such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, are already subject to
those laws, but many other projects are not. 107 Being subject to these
laws has the potential to greatly slow down project approval unless
special provisions are enacted.108 The Bureau of Land Management—
the federal agency that approves the largest number of renewable
energy projects—takes an average of three years to go through the
NEPA process for a project, between the issuance of a notice of intent
to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) and the issuance
of the final EIS.109 FERC takes about the same period of time.110 (To be
fair, many factors external to NEPA delay the NEPA process. 111)
Various methods could be attempted to shorten this process. For
101. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
102. Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era, 109
CAL. L. REV. 209 (2021).
103. About Us, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/
TN3G-HJ7V].
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
106. Id. § 306101.
107. C. H. Eccleston & B. D. Williamson, Determining When NEPA Applies to
Nonfederal Activities 1, 2 (July 1996), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metadc707542/m2/1/high_res_d/657359.pdf [https://perma.cc/H55Y-PX2C].
108. Rossetti, supra note 94, at 2–3.
109. CHARLES P. NICHOLSON, NAT. ASS’N OF ENV’T PROS., 2020 ANNUAL NEPA REPORT 10
(Nov. 2021), https://naep.memberclicks.net/assets/annual-report/NEPA_Annual_
Report_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWM8-TBFJ].
110. Id.
111. John C. Ruple, Jamie Pleune, & Erik Heiny, Evidence-Based Recommendations
for Improving National Environmental Policy Act Recommendations, 46 COLUM. J. ENV’T
L. 275, 304–22 (2022).
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example, a generic EIS could be prepared for a class of projects (e.g.,
solar projects in western deserts), and then each project might be
reviewed with a shorter supplemental analysis. 112 The ESA process
could be conducted simultaneously with the NEPA process.
The BLM employed this method for its Western Solar Plan, but it
had a long startup time. The NEPA process for the programmatic EIS
for this plan took four years and two months. 113 Specific projects were
then approved in less than ten months. 114
Once a programmatic EIS is completed, specific projects can be
approved in less than one year, but the time to prepare the
programmatic EIS is daunting. One way to avoid this problem would
be if these types of projects were somehow exempted from NEPA.
Congress has occasionally exempted projects from NEPA; it did so for
the construction of a border wall between the United States and
Mexico in a law called the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, and during the Trump Administration, the
use of this provision by the Department of Homeland Security was
approved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2019.115
The border wall involved distinctive political issues, and there is no
assurance that Congress would grant a similar exemption for
renewable energy projects—or if it did, that the exemption would not
also be available for fossil fuel projects. Exempting projects from
NEPA, one of the nation’s bedrock environmental laws, would lead to
great controversy.
In order to speed up the NEPA and other federal approval
processes for infrastructure projects, in 2015 Congress passed and
President Obama signed Title 41 of the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation Act, now commonly known as the FAST-41
program.116 For projects that require approvals by several different
federal agencies, the program seeks to coordinate the reviews.117 It
112. Id.
113. The Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS was published on May 29, 2008. 73 Fed.
Reg. 30908. The Notice of Availability of the draft EIS was published on December 17,
2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 78980. The Notice of Availability of the Final EIS was published on
July 27, 2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 44267.
114. Herman K. Trabish, BLM Fast Tracks Permitting for 3 Solar Projects Worth 440
MW on Federal Land, UTIL. DIVE (June 3, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
blm-fast-tracks-permitting-for-3-solar-projects-worth-440-mw-on-federal-lan/
400142 [https://perma.cc/7TYW-BQXR].
115. In re Border Infrastructure Environmental Litigation, 915 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir.
2019).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 4370m.
117. Nathan Eady, Christopher Kane, Christian Marsh, & Patrick Veasy,
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aims to have the entire NEPA process completed within two years.118
The “Permitting Dashboard” established under the program displays
the status of each covered project, and shows how long each step has
taken.119 Of the five wind and solar projects that are shown on the
dashboard as having completed the BLM approval process, two were
completed in less than two years, one in two years five months, and
two in more than four years.120 Nine offshore win projects are listed
as “in progress.”121 For all of them the NEPA process is scheduled to
take about two years (plus or minus two or three months), but we do
not yet know whether this will actually be achieved.122 All in all, the
FAST-41 process may be speeding up project approvals, but it is too
early to know for certain.
Rather than putting projects that otherwise have no federal
involvement into NEPA by giving approval power to a federal agency
and further risking local antagonism by centering all power in
Washington, I believe that a better approach would be to leave
permitting authority with state or local agencies but impose certain
federal restrictions on how those agencies may act. This method
would not invoke NEPA, as federal agencies would not be making
decisions on particular projects.
Some states are moving toward one-stop shopping for renewable
energy facilities. In 2020, New York enacted the Accelerated
Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act. 123 A new state
agency established by this Act, the Office of Renewable Energy Siting
(ORES), is in charge of issuing statewide regulations and then acting
on all applications for renewable energy projects larger than twenty-

Streamlining the Federal Environmental Review Process: The Pros and Cons of FAST-41,
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 2 (Summer 2020), https://www.scsengineers.com/scs-whitepapers/
streamlining-federal-environmental-review-process-fast-41
[https://perma.cc/
22MQ-8MMD].
118. Id. at 1.
119. For the Permitting Dashboard site, see FAST-41 Covered Projects, PERMITTING
DASHBOARD, https://www.permits.performance.gov/projects/fast-41-covered?title=
&term_node_tid_depth=All&term_node_tid_depth_1=2411&field_permitting_project_
adpoint_administrative_area=All&field_project_status_target_id=3036&field_eo_mip_
value=All [https://perma.cc/T2KM-H9BP].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94-c; see also Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New
York’s New Statute on Siting Renewable Energy Facilities, 263 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (May 14,
2020).
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five megawatts.124 ORES must make its final decision on a permit
application within one year of receiving a complete application.125 Any
judicial challenges must be filed within ninety days and go straight to
the intermediate appellate court.126 Municipalities are consulted and
have a right to a hearing, but they do not have permitting authority.127
Substantive municipal laws on these facilities are followed unless
ORES finds them to be “unreasonably burdensome.” 128 Final permits
must provide for host community benefits, such as utility bill
discounts.129 This New York law could provide a good model for other
states.
VI. FUNDING AND INCENTIVES
Stokes suggests making federal funds contingent on states
following the federal guidelines on siting processes and possibly other
requirements, such as land restoration. 130 Eligibility requirements
will clearly have to be set for federal funds, but it is not clear that
following any particular siting process should be one of the
requirements. The principal objective is building a large number of
renewable projects quickly and adding more rules and limitations can
only impede the process, while, in my view, providing only marginal
benefits that do not warrant the delay that would be caused.
Moreover, there is not now much federal money (other than tax
incentives) available for the construction of new renewable energy
projects, though if the Build Back Better law is ever enacted in
something like the form proposed by President Biden, it would
contain $555 billion for clean energy.131
Stokes writes that “a policy that is directly tied to federal funding
will likely garner more support than would a policy solely based on
Commerce Clause authority and no reliance on financial

124. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 94-c.2(h), 94-c.3.
125. Id. § 94-c.3(f).
126. Id. § 94-c.3(g).
127. Id. § 94-c.5(c)(ii), 94-c.6.
128. Id. § 94-c.5(e).
129. Id. § 94-c.5(f).
130. Stokes, supra note 1, at 1818, 1818 n.355.
131. President Biden Announces the Build Back Better Framework, WHITE HOUSE
(Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/10/28/president-biden-announces-the-build-back-better-framework/#:~:
text=The%20framework’s%20%24555%20billion%20investment,practices%
20across%20lands%20and%20waters [https://perma.cc/CVF5-7SX2].
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incentives.”132 That is surely true, but it is no guarantee that all states
will accept this money with the attached strings. Twelve states
rejected the large amounts of federal money for the expansion of
Medicaid that were available under the Affordable Care Act. 133 Many
did so for ideological reasons that might also be at play in the realm of
moving away from fossil fuels.134 The traditional electric utilities also
have important sway over many state governments, and many of them
push back strongly against competition from renewable energy.135
Most economists appear to agree that the best method for
advancing the transition from a fossil fuel-based economy to one
based on clean energy is through the imposition of a carbon tax. 136 If
the tax were set high enough, it would render almost all coal-fired
power plants uneconomical, and it would greatly discourage the
construction of natural gas plants and spur many renewable energy
projects.137 Congress could impose such a tax, but enactment there
seems very unlikely. Early drafts of the Build Back Better bill
contained a Clean Energy Payment Program, which had some
resemblance to a carbon tax on just the electric power industry, but
that provision was removed at the insistence of Senator Joe Manchin
132. Stokes, supra note 1, at 1817.
133. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KFF,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding
-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%
22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/
E47X-BWP6].
134. Ed Kilgore, Ideology Is Still at the Heart of the Red-State Refusal to Expand
Medicaid,
N.Y.
MAG.
(May
5,
2021),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/05/ideology
-not-money-at-heart-of-refusal-to-expand-medicaid.html (last visited May 2, 2022);
Allison M. Baker & Linda M. Hunt, Counterproductive Consequences of a Conservative
Ideology: Medicaid Expansion and Personal Responsibility Requirements, 106 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1181 (2016).
135. See generally LEAH CARDAMORE STOKES, SHORT CIRCUITING POLICY: INTEREST
GROUPS AND THE BATTLE OVER CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES
(2020).
136. Heather Long, ‘This Is Not Controversial’: Bipartisan Group of Economists Calls
for Carbon Tax, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2019/01/17/this-is-not-controversial-bipartisan-group-economists-calls
-carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/LHA5-6ZAP]; PETER HOWARD & DEREK SYLVAN, INST.
POL’Y INTEGRITY, EXPERT CONSENSUS ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 2015),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/ExpertConsensusReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GK46-2PEX].
137. Kathryne Cleary & Karen Palmer, Carbon Pricing 201: Pricing Carbon in the
Electricity Sector, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.rff.org/
publications/explainers/carbon-pricing-201-pricing-carbon-electricity-sector
[https://perma.cc/8TNL-TKUM].
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of West Virginia.138 States could impose a carbon tax, but that would
have limited coverage and would encounter serious difficulties under
the dormant Commerce Clause.139 A nationwide renewable portfolio
standard may be more plausible, but in the current political climate
there can be no confidence that Congress will enact it.
The same can be said about the Stokes proposal. The current
Congress—and certainly the one that seems likely to be elected in the
2022 election—has no inclination to pass the kinds of laws that are
needed to address the climate crisis at anything approaching the
massive and comprehensive scale that is needed. However, should a
Congress be elected someday that is truly serious about climate
change, it will be very useful for it to consider the Stokes proposal,
perhaps with the modifications that I have suggested here.
Meanwhile, and perhaps even then, central roles will be played by the
states, including those that embrace renewables for economic rather
than ideological or environmental reasons, such as Texas.

138. Kate Aronoff, Biden’s Incredible Shrinking Climate Plan, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 21,
2021),
https://newrepublic.com/article/164098/biden-climate-plan-build-back
-better-shrinking [https://perma.cc/2JA5-UXWQ]; see generally NICHOLAS ROY, DALLAS
BURTRAW, & KEVIN RENNERT, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, COST ANALYSIS AND EMISSIONS
PROJECTIONS UNDER POWER SECTOR PROPOSALS IN RECONCILIATION (Oct. 2021),
https://media
.rff.org/documents/IB_21-15_cTjoJFj.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU3Q-DB37].
139. See generally Darien Shanske, State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Can Formulary Apportionment Save the World?, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 191
(2014); Tyler Runstein, Climate Change Regulation, Preemption, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (2021).

